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ABSTRACT
Many laws and ethical documents instruct us that disembodied embryos
created through IVF processes are not mere tissue; they are ‘widely re-
garded’ as unique objects of serious moral consideration. Even in jurisdic-
tions which disavow any overt characterization of embryonic personhood,
the embryo, by virtue of its uniqueness and orientation toward future devel-
opment, is said to have a ‘special status’ or command ‘respect’. The woman
whose desire for a child or children created this embryo, and who inhabits
the body to whom it may one day be returned, is an omission or at best an
afterthought in such frameworks. This paper engages in an historical anal-
ysis of this conundrum in the Australian context. It argues that the institu-
tional structure of foundational ethics bodies (made up of a mandated mix
of scientific and religious representation, in practice dominated bymen, and
absent any requirement of the participation of women patients) has pro-
duced the embryo as an object of ideological compromise: ‘not mere cells’
and ‘not life’, but a poorly bounded and endlessly contested something-in-
between. The paper then turns to engage with the narratives of a selection
of women patients about their sense of connectedness to their stored or dis-
carded embryos, drawn from a larger study on decision making concerning
patient’s experience of decisionmaking about IVF embryos. I drawon these
narratives to ask howwe could reorient law and policy toward the concerns,
needs and desires of such women.
KEYWORDS: human embryos, IVF, reproductive technology, ethical
guidance, embodied relationality, feminist challenges to the disembodied
embryo
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2  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
INTRODUCTION
I’ve only just started thinking about all of this, because . . . I’ve been in this tunnel of young
children—it’s adark, dark tunnel . . . and I’m just comingoutof that and I’m just starting to
go: ‘Oh, right, I need to think about . . .what am I going to do about embryos’?. . . because
they do hover—a cloud that hovers over me—just it’s there and I need to make a de-
cision. . . . I have five minute conversations with my husband. . . there’s always some other
drama happening, someone needs aweewee or someone’s fallen off a chair or whatever. . .
I’m going, ‘The embryos are our children’; he’s going, ‘No, they’re just embryos—hang
on, the phone’s ringing’. And so we never ever had that conversation about what we’re
going to do about them. He’s laughing at me; I’m going, ‘This is breaking my heart, these
embryos’. (Ruby)
Institutionalized ‘regard’ for humanembryoshas takendifferent forms in lawaround
the world, leading to a range of adverse impacts upon the womenwho generated them.
Laws and policies motivated by a belief in the innate sanctity or value of human em-
bryos have tried to prevent embryo destruction through a range of measures, such as
limiting the numbers generated, mandating immediate implantation, prohibiting stor-
age or donation for research, or prohibiting destruction more broadly.1 These laws, in
turn, intrude upon (or completely override) women’s decision making, and/or drive
them into unsafe or less safe reproductive practices, such as increased numbers of stim-
ulated in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycles, higher numbers of embryos being implanted
(leading to higher multiple birth rates), coercive donation practices, or evasive travel
to other regimes for treatment.
Australia, like the UK, could be characterized as broadly liberal and secular in its ap-
proach to the regulation of IVF. Both countries provide fairly liberal access to a wide
range of state-subsidized treatment practices, and neither country has attempted to
attribute personhood2 or specific legal protections to the human embryo. Yet both
have also crafted rules and ethical guidance that refer to the ‘special status’ of the hu-
man embryo3 and prescribe ‘respect’ and ‘regard’ for it—at times in preference to the
desires of the woman who generated it. Storage limits provide a paradoxical example
of this. Mandated statutory limits in the UK4 and some Australian states were based
originally upon fears about the viability of embryos after long-term freezing and about
1 This includes past and present laws in countries such as Italy, Spain, Germany, and Switzerland; for example,
see Françoise Shenfield et al.,Cross Border Reproductive Care in Six EuropeanCountries, 25HUM.REPROD. 1361
(2010); John Robertson, Protecting Embryos and Burdening Woman: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19 HUM.
REPROD. 1693 (2004); Paolo Emanuele L. Setti et al., Italian Constitutional Court Modifications of a Restrictive
Assisted Reproduction Technology Law Significantly Improve Pregnancy Rate, HUM. REPROD. 376 (2011).This is
not to suggest that such laws necessarily reflect the views of medical practitioners, patients, or the public: see
Tanja Krones et al.,What is the Preimplantation Embryo?, 63 SOC. SCI. MED. 20 (2006).
2 For a thoughtful and grounded critique of ‘life debates’ in theUSA and the role of political and cultural context
in generating constructions of the embryo, see Elizabeth Roberts,Abandonment and Accumulation: Embryonic
Futures in the United States and Ecuador, 25MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 232 (2011).
3 See UKDepartment of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology, Cmnd. 9314 (1984) (hereinafter ‘The Warnock Report’), para. 11.17; Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority (HFEA), Code of Practice (2015), para. 15.13. For discussion, see David Gomez,
The Special Status of the Human Embryo in the Regulation of Assisted Conception and Research in the United King-
dom, 17 MLJI 6 (2011).
4 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK), s. 14.
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  3
extending the ‘conventional reproductive competence’ of the mother-to-be,5 but have
since focused more on concern to limit the responsibility of storage providers.6 The
wishes of the woman—whether to utilize the embryo herself in a pregnancy attempt,
to donate it for the reproductive use of another woman, to store it either for a further
period until she is reconciled to its destruction or for an indefinite period if she is not,
or to remove and discard the embryo in circumstances of her own making—are not
prioritized within such a framework.7 The perverse effect of law in this situation is that
the embryo’s welfaremay require its destruction—a destruction that is bothmandated
and respectful. (Although Baroness Warnock herself said, at a later point, ‘You cannot
respectfully pour something down the sink . . . I think that what wemeant by the rather
foolish expression ‘respect’ was that the early embryo should never be used frivolously
. . . ’.8)
When a major review of Australian laws on embryo research was held in 2005, the
terms of reference set down in legislation required the committee to take into account
‘community standards’. An entire chapter of the report was devoted to the question of
what exactly such standards were.9 Ultimately, the committee sidestepped any defini-
tive answerby acknowledging that there is no ‘single set of values and interests (or “stan-
dards”) heldby a single “community”’.10 However, the reportwent on toutilize a device
common in many such policy documents before and since—identifying a pluralistic
moral framework but simultaneously asserting universal regard:
Althougha rangeof viewswas expressed about theprecisemoral status of preimplantation
embryos in particular, there was an overall acceptance that human embryos created by
the fertilisation of a human egg by a human sperm are entities of some social and ethical
significance because of their association with the start of human life.11
I take issue with this premise for two reasons: one is the idea that embryos are of
abstract significance to society at large rather than of specific significance to thewoman
undertaking treatment, and the other is that this significance is due to the potential
for life rather than its representation of the myriad potentialities and desires (both
5 See discussion in Anita Stuhmcke & Eloise Chandler, Storage Limits of Gametes and Embryos: Regulation in
Search of Policy Justification, 22 J. L. MED. 121, 123–125 (2014); The Warnock Report, supra note 3, para.
10.10.
6 See e.g., National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Draft Ethical Guidelines on the
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research; Public Consultation 2015,
section 7 https://consultations.nhmrc.gov.au/public consultations/assisted-reproductive-tech (accessed
Sept. 15, 2016). In the USA and Canada where there are no external storage limits, this concern is more
pressing; see Alana Cattapan & Francoise Baylis, Frozen in Perpetuity: ‘Abandoned Embryos’ in Canada,
REPROD. BIOMED. SOC. (2016) DOI 10.1016/j.rbms.2016.04.002.
7 See Jenni Millbank et al., Enhancing Reproductive Opportunity: A Study of Decision-Making Concerning Stored
Embryos: Report (2013) http://allabouttheembryo.net/embryo wp/?page id=43 (accessed Sept. 15, 2016).
8 HLDeb,Dec. 5, 2002, Col. 1327, quoted inHouse ofCommons Science andTechnologyCommittee,Human
Reproductive Technologies and the Law (2005), FIFTHREPORTOFSESSION 2004–2005, vol. 1, ch. 4, para. 61. And
see Emily Jackson, Fraudulent Stem Cell Research and Respect for the Embryo, 1 BIOSOCIETIES 349 (2006).
9 Legislation Review Committee, Legislation Review: Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 and Research In-
volving Human Embryos Act 2002: Reports (2005) (hereinafter ‘Lockhart Review’), ch. 7. In contrast, the next
review in 2011 spent a mere page on the issue: Legislation Review Committee, Legislation Review: Prohibition
of Human Cloning Act 2002 and Research Involving Embryos Act 2002 (2011) (‘Heerey Review’), para. 4.3.
10 Lockhart Review, supra note 9, at 69, para. 7.1.
11 Lockhart Review, supra note 9, at xv.
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4  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
imagined and real) to the woman herself. It is she who makes these meanings and to
whom regard should be accorded. As Isabel Karpin has argued:
The embryo is only connected with its potential for personhood by female embodiment.
Those who wish to make the argument that all embryos have equivalent value do so only
by rendering the female body irrelevant In order to do this, a complex process of disap-
pearing has to take place.12
To illustrate this issue, legislation in the Australian states of Victoria and Western
Australia continues to maintain strict 10-year limits on embryo storage, although both
now allow requests to the regulator for extensions if there are ‘reasonable’ or ‘special’
grounds. The Western Australian regulator, in a policy document aimed at patients,
notes that while ‘some participants understandably consider that they are entitled to
determine how their embryos are dealt with’ (a position ‘respected and understood’ by
the Council), it is ‘not considered appropriate by the legislature or by Council’ to store
embryos indefinitely. In outlining the considerations which govern the policy on ex-
tensions, the Council includes ‘equity, welfare and general standards prevailing in the
community’. In a section entitled ‘when approval will not be considered’, it identifies
reasons suchas a ‘wish tokeep anembryo in storage indefinitely, or [a]wish tobeburied
with the embryo’.13 In the context of a general policy document, the latter wish is very
particular and must almost certainly have arisen as the result of a specific, and previ-
ously denied, request. If one accepts that an embryo is an entity of significance to the
woman fromwhomand forwhom itwas created, why should herwish to be buriedwith
it not be given serious moral consideration and deferred to unless there is some com-
pelling imperative to do otherwise? How are the views of the community, or regard for
the embryo, determinative of such a wish?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the underlying contest in values over the sub-
ject/object of regard in ethical rules and laws governing IVF practices and stem cell
research—the woman or the embryo—in order to make space for a more profound
rethinking in the future. First, by examining in some detail one Australian policy doc-
ument from the 1980s, I explore in a concrete way how the centrality of the embryo in
the ethical and regulatory terrain was established very early on, and howwomen disap-
peared in this process. Section II then examines how a consistent centering of the em-
bryo continued at the highest levels, by tracing through various iterations of national
ethical guidelines on assisted reproductive treatment. I go on to suggest that the in-
stitutional structure of this key ethics body in Australia, absent a guarantee of female
participation or perspective, continues to predetermine and reproduce this framework
through its mandatory mix of clinical and religious membership.
In Section III of the paper, I turn to ask what could a woman-centered regard look
like? To do so, I relay detailed narratives from five women discussing the disposition
of their stored embryos.These participants were drawn from a larger empirical study of
the impact of law andpolicy on IVFusers inAustraliawith a particular focus ondecision
12 Isabel Karpin,TheUncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human and ReproductionWithoutWomen, 28 SYDNEY.
L. REV. 600, 603 (2006).
13 ReproductiveTechnologyCouncil ofWA,Policy on Embryo Storage andApplications to Extend Beyond 10 Years
(2010) http://www.rtc.org.au/clinics/docs/embryo storage policy.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2016)
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  5
making concerning stored embryos.14 The study comprised 48 interviews with a total
of 54 interviewees augmented by a survey.15 In semistructured interviews, participants
were asked for their views about use of embryos, including scenarios of relationship sep-
aration or death of a partner, as well as their views about donation andwishes regarding
disposal. For thosewhohad actually been throughdonationor disposal follow-upques-
tionswere asked about these experiences.Thus, interviewee’s sense of relationalitywith
the embryo arose through a more targeted and instrumentalist discussion about use
and disposal. Many of these interviewees expressed intense distress and dismay when
facedwith theoperationof legal rules or clinical policies that they experienced as intrud-
ing upon their decision making. As one interviewee, Clarice, noted even the process of
categorization of embryos is arguably not ‘sophisticated enough to capture what those
embryos are to the people who created them’:
Spare to whom? . . . They are spare in the sense, for some of them, that they haven’t been
used yet and, obviously for some of them, they’ll never be used.Well, for a start, those are
two very different categories. In what sense is your future child, for those who might still
be going to use them in the future, spare? Why is that child any more spare or floating or
for some broadGovernment consensus to decide what happens to it [than] a future child
you might have through the normal channels, as it were? . . . I do think the law should ac-
knowledge that surplushas a connotationof additional and, therefore . . . less valuable than
what you already have. I don’t think that that is really the case with embryos. (Clarice)
My focus in this paper is exclusively on the perspective of the woman undertaking
treatment. Although the woman’s partner may also have a considerable emotional in-
vestment in the process, and I do not discount this attachment, this work rests on the
premise, demonstrated throughmuchprevious empiricalwork, thatwomenexperience
a greater sense of connectedness to, and investment in, stored IVF embryos, in part due
14 The study utilized a multimethod recruitment process, using both clinical avenues and broader advertising to
the public and drew responses from patients who had undertaken IVF treatment in all Australian jurisdictions
except the Northern Territory. Volunteers were invited to participate through either engaging in face-to-face
or phone interviews or by filling out a survey either online or by hand. Recruitment covered the period July
2010 to July 2012. The sole inclusion criterion of the broader study was that participants currently or pre-
viously had stored embryos created through IVF. A survey was utilized to gauge broad trends with in-depth
semi-structured interviews to explore participant views and reasoning. Valid surveys were completed by 349
participants. Quantitative data collected through the surveys were statistically analysed with the aid of SPSS.
Qualitative data both in surveys and interviewswere subject to thematic analysis. Eachmember of the research
teamundertookmultiple readings of interview transcripts and survey open responses both throughout the data
collection period and afterwards, coding emergent themes. Identified themes were then subject to compara-
tive analysis among the entire research team to ensure uniformity of interpretation. Ethics approval to conduct
this research was obtained through theUniversity of Technology SydneyHumanResearch Ethics Committee
UTSHREC Reference Number: 2009-262A and 2015000094.
15 Interviews were semistructured. All interviewees are represented by a pseudonym. Interview duration varied
between 30 minutes and 90 minutes, with most lasting around one hour. In common with most empirical re-
search on fertility, participants in the study were overwhelmingly female. Participants tended to be in married
or de facto relationships and were generally between 31 and 40 years of age, had typically commenced treat-
ment in the last 2 to 10 years, conceived children through IVF, andmost still had embryos in storage at the time
of their participation.Nearly half of those with embryos in storage indicated that they had completed their IVF
treatment. While the majority of participants had used their own gametes in their IVF treatment, around one-
thirdwere recipients of donated gametes or embryos. Formore detail on themethods andfindings of the study,
see Jenni Millbank et al., Enhancing Reproductive Opportunity: A Study Of Decision-Making Concerning Stored
Embryos: Report, http://allabouttheembryo.net/embryo wp/?page id=43 (2013), accessed Oct. 5, 2016.
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6  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
to their far greater physical involvement in the process of creating them.16 Embryos
were created from, and of, the woman, and intended for return to her: at the time of
generation these were steps in the process of a pregnancy-to-be, but return was inter-
rupted, prolonged or foreclosed by later events (such as the birth of children, or separa-
tion of a relationship).This sense of disembodiment was experienced as deeply jarring
by interviewees:
knowing that they’re just sitting there, sitting there, sitting there and I can’t use them,
it creates a whole way of thinking around them that is different, I think, than it would
otherwise be. (Danielle)
Women referred to their stored embryos as ‘hovering’ (Ruby, Rose), ‘floating’
(Clarice), ‘suspended’ (Laurie), and ‘remote’ (Sam).Through exploring some of these
narratives, I try to tease out an approach which attends to the individual, even idiosyn-
cratic nature of each woman’s relational matrix, in which her extra-utero embryo (or
embryos) plays some role of significance to her and within her sense of kinship. I draw
upon, andbuildon the relational autonomyworkof feminist theorists such asNedelsky,
Baylis, and Downie among others,17 to argue for a framework of decision making that
has regard to the woman as a connected entity exercising reproductive choice among
a range of outcomes and processes, rather than simply having the option of consenting
to, or refusing, those that are presented to her.18
THE EMBRYO AS ETHICAL SUBJECT
The status of the human embryo in Australian law and ethical guidance literature ap-
pears through a patchwork of injunctions, absences, and prohibitions. These regula-
tions address who may generate and deal with out-of-body embryos through crimi-
nal prohibitions and licensing provisions, dictate how decisions must be made about
embryos in IVF processes (including pregnancy attempts, testing, storage, donation,
and destruction), and by whom and to what uses such embryos may be put when un-
wanted or deemed unsuitable for reproductive use.19 These documents are numerous
and, moreover, have undergone many incarnations since IVF became an accepted and
increasingly widespread medical procedure. The significance and unique value of the
human embryo is a unifying premise across the board. Thus, for example, Australian
national ethics guidelines at different times have instructed that limits to research are
16 See e.g., Emily Jackson, Degendering Reproduction? 16 MED. L. REV. 346 (2008); Tara Cousineau & Alice
Domar, Psychological Impact of Infertility, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES. CLIN. OBSTET. & GYNAECOL. 293 (2007); Sh-
eryl de Lacey, Parent Identity and ‘Virtual’ Children:Why Patients Discard RatherThanDonate Unused Embryos,
20 HUM. REPROD. 1661 (2005); Jenni Millbank et al., Towards Facilitative Regulation of Assisted Reproductive
Treatment in Australia, 20 J. L. MED. 701 (2013).
17 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011);
Françoise Bayliss,TheSelf in Situ: A Relational Account of Personal Identity, in BEINGRELATIONAL:REFLECTIONS
ON RELATIONAL THEORY ANDHEALTH LAW (Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Llewellyn eds, 2012).
18 See e.g., Angela Campbell’s feminist case for ‘choice’ rather than consent, within a framework of critical legal
pluralism: SISTERWIVES, SURROGATES AND SEXWORKERS: OUTLAWS BY CHOICE? (2013).
19 See e.g., supra note 16, Jenni Millbank et al., Towards Facilitative Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Treatment
in Australia, 20 J. L. MED. 701 (2013).
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  7
required to ‘reflect the human nature of the embryo’ (1996),20 that embryos are ‘not
to be treated as mere tissue’ (2004),21 that they ‘warrant serious moral considera-
tion’ (2007, 2015)22 or are ‘widely regarded as objects of serious moral consideration’
(2004), and that they command ‘respect’ (2004).23 Yet the basis of this significance is
often unstated—assumed or simply asserted as a universal truth—with little articula-
tion of why these entities matter and to whom.24 How did it come to pass that ‘we’ all
agreed on the special status of the human embryo, even though no one is recorded as
having agreed on what that status was, exactly?
The 1980s saw a plethora of inquiries and policy documents generated as govern-
ments struggled to keep pace with the rapid development of reproductive technolo-
gies.25 In the Australian federation, parliamentary inquiries, independent law reform
agencies, specialist appointed inquiry bodies, and pre-existing ethical bodies vied with
each other, and often repeated each other, in a flurry of investigation which—at least
in the short term—produced a comparably small amount of legislation regulating the
sphere, but which set an overarching template for the scope and terms of much ethical
guidance, policy and practice in the decades which followed. I have selected for dis-
cussion here a federal parliamentary inquiry that commenced in 1985 and reported in
1986.
TheQuestion Accepted ByAll:What IsTheRespectDueToTheHumanEmbryo?
In 1985, Senator Brian Harradine, a devout Catholic and lifelong anti-abortion advo-
cate, introduced a bill into the Australian Senate to ban ‘non-therapeutic’ experimenta-
tion on human embryos.The bill was referred to a parliamentary committeewith broad
terms of reference which included whether it is necessary, or desirable, to freeze, con-
duct research on, or destroy embryos, and what prohibitions, sanctions, and regulatory
bodies should be established as a consequence of its findings.26 The committee, led by
Senator Tate, ultimately recommended against allowing any form of experimentation
on human embryos.
TheTateReport has oftenbeenoverlooked in favor of othermore robustly reasoned
or directly influential reports (in particular, the Waller inquiry laid out the template
for Victorian law, which was both the first and most comprehensive IVF regulation in
20 National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology (1996) at 1.
21 NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research
(2004) at 13 para. 5.2, 45 para. 15.2.
22 NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research
(2007) at 10 (para. 2.6); NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clin-
ical Practice and Research (Draft) (2015), supra note 6, para. 3.1.
23 NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 28 para. 8.9, 49 para. 17.4.
24 Australia has kept very detailed records of IVF treatment and outcomes since the early 1990s. Yet the number
ofwomenundertaking treatment, rather than the number of treatment cycles, pregnancies, and births, has only
recently been counted. In 2013, almost 40,000 women undertook one or more cycles of IVF treatment. See
AlanMacaldowie et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology in Australia and New Zealand 2013 (2015) at vi.
25 For an overview of these developments, see Dianne Nicol et al., Regulating Biomedical Advances: Embryonic
Stem Cell Research, 2 MACQUARIE L. J. 31 (2002); Don Chalmers, Professional Self-Regulation and Guidelines in
Assisted Reproduction, 9 J. L. MED. 414 (2002).
26 Senate Select Committee on theHuman Embryo Experimentation Bill 1985,Human Embryo Experimentation
in Australia (1986) (hereinafter ‘Tate Report’) at v.
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8  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
Australia).27 While the Tate Report discussed here did not feed immediately into law,
it does appear to have had significant influence on the terms of the nationally applica-
bleEthical Guidelines onAssisted Reproductive Technology (ART) issued by theNational
Health andMedical ResearchCouncil (NHMRC) in 1996, 2004, and 2007. It also pre-
saged aspects of the 2002 prohibition on human cloning laws.The report is of note for
the starkness of the contest of ideas visible in its pages, where the majority character-
izes the embryo as a human subject demanding guardianship, while a vigorous dissent
by two female senators argued for the centrality of women’s reproductive freedom and
decision-making capacity. Looking back 30 years to their arguments gives a dramatic
sense of howdifferent the legislative and ethical frameworks governing IVF inAustralia
would have been had the minority carried the day.
The majority report characterized the embryo as an ethical subject or child-like en-
tity, declaring that ‘the embryo of the human species should be regarded as if it were
a human subject for the purposes of biomedical ethics’.28 The majority report pursued
this characterization most strikingly through two rhetorical maneuvres: asserting that
the Helsinki Declaration on human experimentation29 was applicable to any research
on human embryos and adopting a ‘guardianship’ model toward decision making con-
cerning human embryos. These steps went beyond most other Australian public in-
quiries in overtly characterizing the embryo as a child-becoming. Yet the majority re-
port also introduced a discursive practice replicated in many later reports and ethical
guidelines, namely, the assertion of a pluralistic framework of diverse or divergent views
on the embryo simultaneouslywith the assertion of universal regard for the human em-
bryo as a distinct and valued entity to whom something is owed.30
In a diverting side step, the majority claimed a ‘well-accepted’ ethical framework
when introducing the very features that were most contentious31 in its reasoning, say-
ing at the outset:
The Committee recognises that in putting forward its view in a pluralist society it cannot
claim to reflect a unanimous view of the community. Nevertheless it considers that . . . its
resolution of the issues is based on other well accepted features of our social and legal
arrangements, particularly guardianship and biomedical ethics . . . It is in this framework
that the Committee answers the question accepted by all as the correct query: what is the
respect due to the human embryo?32
Over 30 years have passed and, in my view, we are all still caught in a framework
that perpetually asks and answers this wrong question—as if it were the obvious and,
27 Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilisation, 1982–1984,
Consolidated Reports (1990) (‘Waller Reports’). On the history of this legislation in comparison with the UK
approach, see Kerry Petersen,The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: A Comparative Study of Per-
missive and Prescriptive Laws and Policies, 9 J. L. MED. 483 (2009).
28 Tate Report, supra note 26, at 3.18.
29 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects (1964) (amended 2013).The declaration was reproduced in full in Appendix VII to the Tate Report.
30 See e.g., Lockhart Review, supra note 9, at 87.
31 For a contemporaneous critique, seePascalKasimba&StephenBuckle,Embryos andChildren: ProblemsRaised
by the Majority Report of the Tate Report on Human Embryo Experimentation, 2 AJFL 228 (1988).
32 Tate Report, supra note 26, at xiii (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the majority rests its conclusions on the ‘eth-
ical behaviour owed to that entity resulting from the fertilisation’: Id., para. 2.15.
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  9
indeed, only question.33 I suggest that we still do not ask, as we ought to, ‘What is the
respect due to the woman undertaking treatment?’
ThemajorityTateReport laid down a blueprint of the subject embryo, a uniquely hu-
man entity oriented toward future development that must be respected and protected.
If, as is the view of the Committee, the embryo may be properly described as genetically
new human life organised as a distinct entity oriented towards further development, then
the stance and behaviour proper to adopt towards it would include not frustrating a pro-
cess which commands respect because its thrust is towards the further development of a
biologically individuated member of the human species.34
It is worth highlighting the disappearance of women in this framework through the
simple reversal of replacing the embryo with a woman in the text, which might then
look something like this:
As the woman undertaking treatment is existing human life oriented towards further repro-
duction; the stance and behaviour proper to adopt towards her . . . includes not frustrating
her process, which commands respect because it is hers.
Interestingly, Senators Crowley and Zakharov in theminority appear to have found
it rhetorically easier to replace the embryo with a rock than with a woman when they
argued in their dissenting report:
Any object or thing has an infinite number of possible future courses. For a non-sentient
or inanimate thing, e.g., a rock, the particular future outcome that actually happens is de-
termined by forces outside of itself. An embryo is like a rock in this respect—it cannot
make decisions for itself. Its future is decided by others. It has potential only in virtue of
decisions by others about it.35
The minority report concurred with the majority that, unlike a rock, the embryo’s
developmental potential is something of ‘great significance’, but argued that ‘without a
uterus, there is no development’ and, thus, the focus should be on the decision-making
capacity of the woman.36 With rather unnerving prescience, they noted that unless it is
the woman who makes decisions, ‘society will determine the developmental potential
of the embryo’.37
Crowley and Zakharov critiqued the inherent contradictions in the ‘guardianship’
and subject/patient models of embryonic status promoted by the report, noting, for
example, that the freezing of embryos for possible later use cannot be characterized as a
therapeutic interventiononbehalf of the embryo (not least of all becauseof the very low
success rateswith thawing at the time).Rather, embryonic freezing is amedical decision
33 TheWarnock Report asked, in a slightly less loaded fashion, ‘how is it right to treat the human embryo?’ (supra
note 3, para. 11.09). In 2002, the UKHouse of Commons Science and Technology Committee stated, ‘At the
heart of any review of assisted reproduction legislation is the fundamental question of the status to be accorded
to the human embryo’ (supra note 8, vol. 1, ch. 3, para. 24).
34 Tate Report, supra note 26, at xiv (conclusions para. 6).
35 Id. at [D.20], 70.
36 Id. at [D.23], [D.28].
37 Id. at [D.24].
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10  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
made by, and for the health benefit of the intended mother.38 Likewise, the minority
senators noted that themajority report did not support implantation against thewishes
of the woman, and therefore countenanced the willful destruction of embryos as an
inevitable consequence of women’s participation in IVF treatment programs.39
The minority argued it was a ‘consequential logical step’ that the woman making
decisions about implantation should ‘have the same unfettered responsibility for deci-
sions prior to implantation’.40 They concluded that the woman ‘into whose uterus the
embryo is placed’ or the couple,
should determine all such other decisions as to, for example, howmany embryos are pro-
duced, howmany are placed in the uterus at any one time, whether and howmany of their
embryos are frozen, and if and when such surplus embryos are allowed to succumb. In all
these decisions the couple will have regard to the advice, information and counsel given
them by their doctor . . . .
. . . .
Women have had to fight for their rights to their children in times past. We see the same
arguments as to their rights apply here.Thewoman and/or the couple are the appropriate
and proper decision makers.41
It bears reflecting that many of these decisions continue to be severely constrained,
or even removed, by law and policy, rather than being in the hands of the woman un-
dergoing treatment.
THE EMBRYO AS SUBJECT OF REGARD IN NATIONAL ETHICAL
GUIDELINES
ART ethical guidelines, alert from the outset to the movement of embryos from the
realm of reproductive treatment to research, have addressed both practices.42 These
guidelinesperforma significant role innational regulationofART inAustralia, although
their influence has changed over time.43 Since 2002, national law has provided that
embryos can only be used or developed in the course of a woman’s reproductive treat-
ment by ART units that have been accredited by the Fertility Society of Australia’s
38 Put simply, the reduced likelihood of successful thawing and implantation per embryo is subsumed by the
benefit to the woman of fewer stimulated IVF cycles (and her ability to control the timing and spacing of her
children through enhanced ability to attain a pregnancy at a later age with ‘younger’ embryos).
39 Thispoint remains germane, as the creationof extra embryos for storage is routine IVFpractice (a cycle creating
around 10–15 embryos is regarded as ‘ideal’, with a strict Australian standard of transferring only one or, in
certain circumstances, a maximum of two embryos at a time). See Sesh Sunkara et al., Association Between the
Number of Eggs and Live Births in IVF Treatment, 26 HUM. REPROD. 1768 (2011).
40 Tate Report, supra note 26, at [D.48].
41 Id. at [D.50], [D.52].
42 Sarah Franklin, Embryonic Economies: The Double Reproductive Value of Stem Cells, 1 BIOSOCIETIES 71 (2006).
43 When first established, theNHMRCGuidelines were the only form of external governance of ART practice in
Australia, pre-dating anyState-based legislation, and influential through apeer-norm-based inspection andvol-
untary compliance process:NHMRC, InVitro FertilisationCentres inAustralia:TheirObservance of theNational
Health and Medical Research Council Guidelines (1987). After Victoria introduced legislation regulating ART
in 1984 (operative from 1988) as did South Australia in 1988 and Western Australia in 1991, the NHMRC
guidelines were subordinate to law in those states, but continued to operate in all other states and territories.
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  11
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC), which in turn requires
evidence of compliance with the NHMRC Ethical Guidelines.44 In addition, three of
the four Australian states that currently legislate on the provision of ART in their ju-
risdictions also explicitly require compliance with the NHMRC Ethical Guidelines.45
Thus, the currentNHMRCguidelines, althoughexpressed in theflexible andnormative
mode of ‘guidelines’ rather than law, are actually enshrined by law as the most signifi-
cant governance instrument in ART practice across Australia.
The first guidance from the NHMRC came in the 1982 In Vitro Fertilisation and
Embryo Transfer: Supplementary Note 4 to the NHMRC Statement on Human Experi-
mentation,which predated the findings of theWarnock Report. At a page and a half, the
document is astonishingly brief to the modern eye. It covers nine points in total, ad-
dressing the requirement of an institutional ethics committee and record keeping, the
treatment of infertility within ‘an accepted family relationship’, requirements of con-
sent for patients and donors, the claim that surrogacy is ‘not yet capable of ethical res-
olution’ because of the uncertainty of maternal status, the unacceptability of cloning,
and the ability for conscientious objection by clinic staff. While point 7 states that the
‘wishes of donors’ (gamete providers) should be taken into account in setting a stor-
age limit for embryos, the document undoes this rather by going on to recommend ‘a
set upper limit which would be of the order of ten years’—a limit that is then carried
through several iterations of the guidelines over the following three decades. Stuhmcke
andChandler note that at the time this limit was first proposed the freezing of embryos
was still a highly experimental procedure; yet the limit haspersisted and ‘regulators have
continued to cast the need for storage limits as being self-evident’.46
The 1996 Guidelines are considerably more detailed and reflect the influence of the
1986 Tate Report. For example, the Introduction to the 1996 Guidelines includes the
‘ethical and social values’ engaged by ART, recognizing that:
[A]ny experimentation and research involved in these technologies should be limited in
ways which reflect the human nature of the embryo, acknowledging that there is a diversity
of views on what constitutes themoral status of a human embryo, particularly in the early
stages of development.47
In a brief, one-page section on research, the 1996 Guidelines direct that ‘non-
therapeutic research’ which ‘does not harm the embryo’ may be approved by an ethics
44 Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth), s. 11. RTAC, Code of Practice for Assisted Re-
productive Technology Units (revised Aug. 2015) (‘RTAC Code of Practice’), http://www.fertilitysociety.
com.au/wp-content/uploads/RTAC-COP-2015.pdf (accessed June 1, 2016).
45 See Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2010 (SA), reg. 8(2)(a); Victorian Assisted Reproductive
Treatment Authority (VARTA), Information for Registered ART Providers (Jan. 2014) notes that compliance
with the NHMRC Ethical Guidelines is a condition of registration; see Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act
2008 (Vic), pt. 8; HumanReproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA), ss 33(2)(ea), 29(5)(aa). NSWdoes not
expressly require this, but there are few areas of inconsistency: Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007
(NSW).
46 Stuhmcke&Chandler, supra note 5, at 132. Notably in 290 survey responses in the current study to a question
about desired storage limits only 55 respondents nominated a limit under 10 years, with themajority preferring
no limit or a limit framed in terms of the recipient’s reproductive lifetime: see Isabel Karpin et al.,Analysing IVF
Participant Understanding of, Involvement in, and Control over Embryo Storage and Destruction in Australia, 20 J.
L. MED. 811 (2013).
47 NHMRC (1996), supra note 20, at 1 (emphasis added).
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12  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
committee, but procedures that involve destruction should only be approved in excep-
tional circumstances.48 In a discursive frame that arguably anthropomorphizes the em-
bryo, the guidelines provide that ‘embryo experimentation should normally be limited
to therapeutic procedures which leave the embryo, or embryos, with an expectation of
implantation and development’.49 The embryo is framed not as an object of concernwith
a future potentiality that should be protected, but rather as a subjectwith its own expec-
tations of futurity in amanner very reminiscent of the 1986TateReport.This statement
appears to belie the pluralism of the opening introduction in the 1996 ethical guidance
on the diversity of views on the ‘moral status’ of the embryo as it is implicitly accorded
a version of personhood or sentience.The other effect, relatedly, is to erase the woman
(and her partner) who created, and presumably consented to any research activity on
their embryo. It is her body in which the hope of implantation rests and surely it is she
who holds an expectation that the embryo will be implanted, rather than the other way
around. Yet her wishes and concerns vanish.
The 2003 Draft Guidelines for Public Consultation (which preceded the 2004
Guidelines) state that the working group was guided by ‘a respect for human life at all
stages of development’.50 This provision was notably dropped from the final version.51
A number of other changes between the drafts and final versions of the guidelines alert
us to the contested values concerning embryos, and those who generate them, within
the committee. For instance, the 2003 Draft Guidelines provided, ‘People who wish to
make use of reproductive procedures should be encouraged to do so in ways that are
respectful of human life and the dignity of all human beings’.52 In the 2004 final ver-
sion, however, ‘human life’ has been removed and replaced with ‘all involved’, and the
injunction no longer applies to the patients who use ART but rather to the clinicians
who provide it.53 The 2004 Guidelines also added for the first time a stand-alone pro-
vision headed, ‘Respect human embryos’, which states that ‘While there are different
views held in our community about themoral status of a human embryo, one view that
is very widely shared is that embryos are not to be treated asmere tissue’.54 So while we
can’t agree upon what embryos are, we are all taken to agree on what they are not. The
placing of this statement is also revealing as it is immediately followed by a subprovi-
sion requiring clinicians to limit the number of embryos created.Thus, the overarching
object of the provision is to ward off the prospect of the future destruction of unused
embryos.
More strikingly, the language of life, and death, has fluctuated across iterations.
For example, the language of death and dying that appeared in relation to embryo
destruction in the 2003 draft was replaced in the 2004 final version by the terminology
48 Id. at 10, paras 6.3, 6.4.
49 Id., para. 6.2 (emphasis added).
50 NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research: Draft for
Public Consultation (Feb. 2003) at 2.
51 The final version instead states that ‘the welfare of people who may be born as a result of the use of ART is
paramount’ and then includes, for the first time, ‘the autonomy’ of individuals utilizingART:NHMRC(2004),
supra note 21, at 5, paras 2.5, 2.6.
52 NHMRC (2003), supra note 50, para 5.1.
53 NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 13, para. 5.1.
54 Id. (para. 5.2). Repeated in the section on research, Id. at 45, para. 15.2.
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Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  13
of ‘disposal’.55 Conversely, the 2007 amendments, repeated in the 2015 draft, intro-
duced the language of ‘life’ with the inclusion of a non-statutory56 and, arguably, sur-
plus definition of the ‘embryo’ as ‘a living entity in the earliest stages of development’
(at the same time that such language was dropped from federal legislation).
Whilemany incarnations of the guidelines include some reference to ‘regard’ for the
‘long-term welfare’ of the women and men who utilize ART with various provisions
concerning requirements for informed consent, patients are arguably rendered passive
objects insofar as they are governed by rules that delimit what they may and may not
consent to, rather than active subjects who should be consulted, or deferred to, in gen-
erating or determining options or actions. There is one striking exception in the 1996
Guidelines concerning disposal: ‘Embryos may be allowed to succumb by withdrawal
of support. Each clinic is to have protocols in place for this purpose. If indicated in their
consent, the preferences of a couple who generated an embryo are to be respected in this
matter’.57 This carries through to the 2004/2007 Guidelines which continue to include
provision for ‘respect’ for ‘the wishes of the persons for whom the embryos are stored’,
specifically in relation to the decision to discard, and the method of disposal.58 It is in-
teresting that in the 2015 Draft Guidelines the comparable provisions on storage and
disposal drop the language of respect for the embryo (or the wishes of its progenitors)
and instead speak of ‘managing’ storage and disposal of embryos, offering ‘options’ and
‘reasonable time’ for the ‘individual or couple’ to consent or take action.59 The lan-
guage of regard, respect, and wishes falls away in the 2015 draft. The overall message
from these changes is ambiguous: the presence of patients is more prominent, with ref-
erences throughout to ‘individuals and couples’ undertaking treatment, yet these ref-
erences are continually ungendered. Apart from an introductory provision requiring
respect for ‘women and intended parents’, the woman seeking pregnancy is never ex-
plicitly mentioned.
In fact women, as such, hardly appear at all in any iteration of the guidelines. There
is only one instance in the research provisions of the 2004 version (amended 2007)
of the guidelines in which the woman patient’s well-being is linked to concern for the
embryo within a frame of maternality. Under the heading, ‘Respect the embryo and
all persons involved’, the provision reads: ‘Respect for the dignity and wellbeing of the
mother and the embryomust takeprecedenceover any expectedbenefits of knowledge.
55 Compare NHMRC (2003), supra note 50, paras. 9.7, 9.13 with NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 27, 28,
paras 8.5, 8.7.2 (‘die’ in the 2003 draft was replaced in the final 2004 version with ‘disposal’. This was likewise
reflected in the provisions on research, the 2003 draft refers to information being given to embryo providers
that the ‘embryo is allowed to die’, which was replaced in the 2004 version with information on ‘what will
happen to each embryo’).
56 The 2004Guidelines contained a definition of ‘human embryo’ that reflected the terms of 2002 federal legisla-
tion (‘a live embryo’). A revised 2006 legislative definition of ‘human embryo’ (‘a discrete entity’) was reflected
in the definition of ‘human embryo’ in the 2007 revision of the ethical guidelines, and then carried through into
the 2015 draft guidelines: Prohibition on Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth), s. 8; Research Involving Human
Embryos Act 2002 (Cth), s. 7. The added definition of ‘embryo’ therefore sits alongside the definition of ‘hu-
man embryo’.
57 NHMRC (1996), supra note 20, at 11, para. 7.4 (emphasis added).
58 NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 27–28, paras 8.7, 8.9.1.
59 NHMRC (2015), supra note 6, paras 7.2, 7.3, 7.6.
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14  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
There must be no foreseeable harm to the embryo that would make it unfit for transfer
to the woman’.60
While the heading centers the embryo, the text of the provision appears to reverse
this by beginning with ‘the mother’. This language is particularly striking because she
is not—yet—a mother. She is someone who intends to be a mother. Elsewhere, she is
‘the woman’ or a ‘person for whom the embryo was created’, a ‘person responsible for
the embryo’ or a ‘gamete provider’. Here the woman and her embryo’s interests and
well-being are aligned for the only time as her maternality is envisaged—even though
the embryo is still at this point disembodied. Transfer is imagined as the (shared) goal,
and they are ‘the mother and the embryo’. In another sense, one could argue that the
provision implies that she is the mother that the embryo has an expectation of being im-
planted within. Respect and dignity are language choices that occur elsewhere in the
guidelines in relation to the entity of the embryo suggesting that it is human-ish; they
are discordant choices for a woman’s intentions and desires for achieving pregnancy,
again suggesting a reorienting of value toward the embryo even when the woman her-
self makes a rare appearance.
Isabel Karpin has argued that,
Failure, excess, loss, repetition, and waiting as well as successes are all part of the IVF
experience. They are part of the woman’s embodied experience of the process and often
lead to the development of a powerful feeling of connectedness with the frozen embryo
that didn’t exist at the beginning of the process.
. . . .
[A] legal response that treats all embryos as the same, requiring an abstract form of
disengaged respect at the same time as a pragmatic recognition of their disposability, fails
to account for the complex and embedded integration of these embryos in the selfhood
of the women who care about them.61
I suggest that the institutional structure behind the Australian ethical guidelines is,
at least in part, responsible for creating this space for the embryo as a contested but
constantly centered ethical subject, not-quite-life but not-mere-cells.
Knowledge and Expertise
The National Health and Medical Research Act of 1992 set up a legislative structure
for the organization and in the process abolished the first set of 1982 ART guide-
lines. Each set of guidelines has been since been produced by a two-stage consultation
process mandated by the legislation, in which a public consultation is followed by a
draft document that then forms the basis of further consultation before final guidelines
are produced.62 While this is an admirably transparent process in guaranteeing input
from professionals, researchers, and the public, the transition to this model involved,
60 NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 49, para. 17.4; NHMRC (2007), supra note 22, at 71, para. 17.7.The 2007
revision separates out research on embryos that will be used to attempt pregnancy and those that will not. In
contrast to the Tate Report, then, the approach to therapeutic intervention in the guidelines also addresses the
interest of the woman in having access to a viable embryo.
61 Isabel Karpin,The Legal and Relational Identity of the Non-Yet Generation, 4 L. INNOVATION & TECHNOL. 122,
140, 141 (2012).
62 National Health andMedical Research Council Act 1992 (Cth), s. 13.
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regrettably, abandoning an earlier commitment to the input of ‘women and men’, in-
cluding ‘at least one laywoman and one layman’.63
Since 1992 the statutory composition of the Australian Health Ethics Committee,
the body responsible for issuing the guidelines, mandated by s 36 requires a Chair and
those with knowledge/expertise in:
 ethics of medical research;






 public health research;
 social science research;
 clinical medical practice;
 nursing or allied health practices;
and understanding of:
 health consumer issues;
 concerns of peoplewith a disability (alongwith nomore than two ‘other persons’ with
relevant expertise).
There appears to be an implicit hierarchy of knowledge, expertise, experience, and
understanding as epistemological forms relevant to the Committee’s work.There is no
requirement of gender equity, nor of lay or consumer membership as such. Thus far,
the person with expertise in religion has always been a minister of religion and/or a
theologian—always a Christian, always a man, and usually a Catholic. At no stage has
there ever been equal representation of women on the working groups responsible for
the ART ethical guidelines. If anything gender parity has declined with the passage of
time.64 Perhaps of greater significance is that only one member is selected to represent
‘knowledgeof issues that concernpeoplewhoaccess reproductive technology’.Thisno-
tably does not specify a woman who has herself undertaken IVF, and generally appears
63 NHMRC, Supplementary Note 1 Institutional Ethics Committees (IEC) (1992).
64 The membership of the group which devised the 1982 Supplementary Note is not public. However, the
1986 review of implementation of the guidelines was undertaken by a nine-person Medical Research Ethics
Committee, in which there were three women: two laywomen and one scientist. The 1996 Guidelines were
put together by a working group established in 1994, which had seven people on it, of whom three were
women: NHMRC (1996), supra note 20, at unnumbered page. The 2004 version comprised two sepa-
rate working groups over the period of development, the first with three female members out of a panel
of nine, and the second with three out of 10: NHMRC (2004), supra note 21, at 55, 56 (Appendix A).
The 2015 version was devised by a group of 11, of whom 4 were women: Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology (ART)Working Committee,Disclosure of Interests (2015) https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/ files nhmrc/
file/health ethics/ethcial issues/disclosure of interests july 2015.pdf (accessed June 1, 2016).
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16  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
to be someone with current or past experience as an infertility or genetics counselor or
nurse.
I suggest that this institutional model, excluding women patients and requiring re-
ligious input, locks us into an ethical framework that, through every incarnation of tin-
kering, continues to center the abstract entity of the disembodied human embryo at
the expense of the embodied woman patient. Although I ammore concerned with the
understandings and views of women patients than the community at large, it is note-
worthy that one of the few Australian studies of community attitudes to the human
embryo found that:
[I]mportant gender differences were identified. . .Women were more likely to indicate
that the right way to use an embryo was to transfer it to another woman or use it in re-
search help another infertile woman. . . .Women were also more likely to reject the in-
volvement of external decisionmakers such as ethics committees or Government bodies,
or even the man whose spermatazoon was used to make the embryo in decisions about
embryo disposition.
. . .
As far as is known, the difference in views between women andmen pertaining to em-
bryo status, acceptable uses and responsibility for disposition decisions is one that has not
been previously identified or investigated in community consultation. The present find-
ings suggest that it is important to address gender difference in consultation processes
and to have balanced gender representation in policy-making processes.65
This leads me to the embodied woman patient, and the question of what she might
regard as important or relevant in decision making about stored IVF embryos
WHAT WOULD WOMAN-CENTERED REGARD LOOK LIKE?
Feminist relational autonomy accounts of personhood ‘repudiate the notion of a dis-
embodied rational calculator’ and instead attend to the agency of ‘embodied, socially
engaged beings’.66 In 2006, Karpin suggested that a feminist regulatory response to
ART ‘begin by challenging the primacy of the disembodied embryo’, including chal-
lenging ‘both its physical detachment from the female body and its social detachment
from the parental relation’ by foregrounding the figure of the ‘not yet pregnant pregnant
woman’.67 In recent joint work, we have proposed, building upon the work of feminist
theorists such as Nedelsky, Baylis, and Downie among others, a relational sense of the
embryo that centers the woman and values the ‘intensely personal and infinitely vari-
able’meaning of the embryo to her.68 This frame allows us to regard awoman’s decision
making concerning her stored embryos as part of a broader political and social context
65 Sheryl de Lacey et al, Perceptions of Embryo Status and Embryo Use in an Australian Community, 24 REPROD.
BIOMED. ONLINE 727, 742, 743 (2012).
66 Anne Donchin, Towards a Gender-Sensitive Assisted Reproduction Policy, 23 BIOETHICS 28, 34 (2009).
67 Karpin, supra note 12, at 621.
68 Jenni Millbank et al., Towards Facilitative Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Treatment in Australia, 20 J. L.
MED. 701 (2013), supra note 16, at 704. Cf. Martin Johnson, Escaping the Tyranny of the Embryo? A New Ap-
proach to ART Regulation Based on UK and Australian Experiences, 21 HUM. REPROD. 2756 (2006) (arguing
for a distinction between the embryo intended to be a child and the embryo not so intended); see also Lock-
hart Review, supra note 9 (featuring a number of supporters of this distinction based on intended use in ch. 7,
‘Community Standards on Status and Use of Embryos’).
 at U
niversity of T








Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo  17
but also accepts that this experience incorporates an individualized, fluid and variable
sense of kinship and belonging, inwhich the embryomay (but notmust) be regarded as
part. As with feminist work on pregnancy loss, it is a difficult but important task to craft
a space in public discourse that can acknowledgewomen’s experience of relationality in
reproduction without having fetal/embryonic personhood claims imposed upon it.69
This is particularly difficult in political contexts where anti-abortion discourse is preva-
lent (such as in the USA where it has extended to claims of personhood for embryos,
including for example the imposition of ‘adoption’ models onto practices such as em-
bryo donation).70
In this section of the paper, I explore the ‘matrix of relations’ through the narratives
of a series of women patients from our study, each of whom was speaking about the
prospect of destruction of her stored embryos, although for some that prospect was
more imminent than for others (and one had actually kept physical possession of the
vials in which her embryos had previously perished).There is a rich body of published
research addressing patient decision making about stored embryos, which I do not at-
tempt to address here.71 Rather I focus on a small number of women in detail, in order
to illustrate theunique relational nature of eachwoman’s understandingof her embryos
and how they fit for her with her own sense of herself as a mother and patient, and with
her partner, children, and other kin. I stress that very few participants in our study, and
noneof thewomenquotedhere, understood their own embryos to be ‘life’ or attributed
personhood or almost babyhood to them. Likewise very few participants were opposed
to destruction of embryos per se. They also notably did not speak of embryos as some-
thing special, requiring regard in an abstract sense, or about the value that should be
accorded to other people’s embryos; rather they spoke about the value andmeaning of
their own embryos in a very specific, conditional, and, I suggest, embodied relation.
Regard as a relation, and as the product of labor: Rose
At the time of interview, Rose was the single mother of a six-month-old child. Rose
had eight embryos in storage which she had not yet decided whether she would utilize
in further pregnancy attempts. Considering the possibility of future destruction, Rose
said:
[B]ecause of the very personal process I had to go through to get them and the fact that
one of them is my daughter asleep in the bedroom [I feel] that they deserve better than
just sort of being defrosted on a bench and flushed down the sink or whatever is going to
happen to them. I would like the chance to be able to do something with them.
Likemany other participants, Rose expressed the view that her stored embryoswere
closely connected to her through their connection with her existing child or children.
69 See e.g., HelenKeane, Foetal Personhood and Representations of the Absent Child in Pregnancy LossMemorializa-
tion, 10 FEMINISTTHEORY 153 (2009); Catherine Kevin, ‘I Did Not LoseMy Baby. . .My Baby Just Died’ Twenty-
First Century Discourses on Miscarriage in Political and Historical Context, 110 SOUTH ATL. Q. 849 (2011).
70 See e.g., Bernard Dickens,The Use and Disposal of Stored Embryos, 134 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GYNAE-
COLOGY AND OBSTETRICS 114 (2016); Glenn Cohen, ‘Religion and Reproductive Technology’ in LAW, RELIGION
ANDHEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Lynch H., Cohen G. & Sepper E. eds, forthcoming 2017).
71 For a concise summary, see Sheryl de Lacey,DecisionMaking about Frozen SupernumeraryHuman Embryos, 16
HUM. FERTIL. 31 (2013).
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18  Reflecting the ‘human nature’ of the IVF embryo
This sense of sibling connection was expressed by participants in our study, as by those
inmany other studies,72 particularly in relation to reluctance to donate embryos for the
reproductive use of another woman.73 Yet it also went far beyond this.
Formany of our participants, this sense of connectionwith embryoswas particularly
acute when, as with Rose, their child had come from the same treatment cycle: that
is, when one embryo had been transferred and became an existing child while others
from the same ‘batch’ were stored for later use. In such instances, a number of women
expressed a sense of their embryos as spectral twins of their existing child—‘Is there
going to be another little girl with red hair like my daughter has, or a little boy, is he
going to look exactly the same as him, because they’ve come from the same batch?’
(Phoebe)—or as interchangeable with them—‘I look at myClaudia and I go, “My god
they’re all potential Claudia’s”’ (Ruby)— ‘It was just the embryologist’s choice which
meantwehave the babies . . . we donowandnot oneor both of those in storage’ (Survey
241).74
Many women said that they did not want their embryos to be wasted, or treated as
waste (Juliet, Joanne, Sarah, Sam) and expressed distress at the prospect of them being
‘flushed’ or ‘shoved’ down the sink or toilet (Nikki, Ruby, Sam, Kate), or ‘chucked’ in
a bin (Veronica, Danielle). Here Rose articulates her embryos as ‘deserving’ of ‘some-
thing better’ than an imagined and abject ending—awaste product left on a bench and
‘flusheddown the sink’. In this sense she is reflecting the idea innational ethics guidance
that embryos are not mere cells and even could be seen as putting a subject position re-
quiring regard: in that it is they that deserve a particular end or process. Yet wrapped
around this is a series of other relationships and demands for regard. The embryos de-
serve this because of what Rose herself had to go through to get them. It is her embodied
effort, pain, and sacrifice in IVFprocesses that call for regard to be given to them, aswell
as their interchangeability with her sleeping child. Thus, Rose articulates her embryos
simultaneously as both ‘work object’ and ‘love object’.75 However, she does so not to
assert their inherent value, but rather her own desire to have some control over the out-
come and ‘do something with them’ when they are discarded. Her choice would be to
bury them in her garden.
Connection to the body: Apple
At the time of interview, Apple had a one-year-old child and was mid-cycle in a fur-
ther pregnancy attempt, which she described as having ‘two [embryos] with me at the
moment, and one on ice’. Like Rose, Apple did not actually know what occurred when
embryos are discarded and so imagined it as a process of abandonment or clinical dis-
regard:
72 See e.g., Bangsboll et al., Patients’ Attitudes Towards Donation of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos for Treatment
and Research, 19 HUM. REPROD 2415(2004); Giuliana Fuscaldo et al,How to Facilitate Decisions about Surplus
Embryos: Patients’ Views, 22 HUM. REPROD. 3129 (2007).
73 See e.g., Sheryl de Lacey, supra note 16;Parent Identity and ‘Virtual’ Children:Why Patients Discard Rather than
Donate Unused Embryos, 20 HUM. REPROD. 1661 (2005).
74 For a more detailed discussion, see JenniMillbank et al., Embryo Donation for Reproductive Use in Australia, 20
J. L. MED. 789 (2013).
75 See Kathryn Ehrich et al.,TheEmbryo asMoralWork Object: PGD/IVF Staff Views and Experiences, 30 SOCIOL.
HEALTH ILLN. 772 (2008) (discussing these issues in the context of ART staff, rather than women patients);
see also Karpin, supra note 61, at 142 (describing the embryo as a ‘nascent love object’).
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[L]eaving them to die in a Petri dish seems wrong. Just sort of letting them defrost and
nevermake it kindof seemswrong. So in an idealworld, and Idon’t know if it’s a possibility
but what I’d like to do is have them put back in at a time where I know they’re not going
to make it so at least they’re in the right environment when they don’t make it.
Apple expresses awish forwhathasbeen termed ‘compassionate transfer’ in the liter-
ature,76 a process not publicly offered in Australia, and only available when requested
by the patient at certain clinics, in which the embryos are transferred at a time in the
woman’s cycle or in such a way (for example to the vagina rather than the uterus) that
they are very unlikely to result in pregnancy.
Although Apple begins by saying ‘die’ and ‘defrost’ when referring to the imagined
end in the Petri dish, she then re-characterizes this end as ‘not making it’ and wants
this process to be completed within her body which is ‘the right environment’. Many
women we interviewed expressed a sense of discomfort or wrongness at the ongoing
and unanticipated out-of-bodyness of their stored embryos. This was reflected in their
language around disposal, which invoked images of being tossed in rubbish bins or
flushed down sinks or toilets. Apple’s renaturalization of the disposal process is ex-
pressed as something mitigating an implicit sense of loss (‘at least they’re in the right
place’) that follows a logical order of the cycle in which, regardless of pregnancy, the
embryos are returned to the body whence they came. Accordingly, her claim of rela-
tion is about the embryos’ relation to her body as well as about her relation to the IVF
process, which is perhaps more acute because she is in the process as she speaks.
An end that is not yet final: Phoebe
Phoebe had two children from IVF and seven embryos from the same treatment cycle
that she had stored for 10 years. At the time of interview she had been compelled to
dispose of these embryos when the storage limit was reached in her jurisdiction and
her clinic withdrew the option to donate embryos to research (which had been her
preference). She had approached her clinic and been permitted to take her embryos
home. Phoebe said that she ‘wasn’t silly’ and was well aware that the embryos were no
longer viable within a short time of taking possession of them, repeatedly noting that
they weren’t ‘really there’ anymore. Nonetheless, she had placed the vials in the butter
compartment of her fridge, where they had remained for the past ninemonths. Phoebe
explained this process:
[T]hey’re still sitting inmy fridge because I nowdon’t knowwhere—Iknow I sound like a
fruit loop but I’mnot. I don’t knowwhere to put them.We’d decided thatwewould either
plant a tree or something like that; we would incorporate them, pot them in with the tree
and that would be our memory sort of thing. But probably the fact that we’ve got a puppy
. . . and she’s a total nut case, I think she’d dig the tree up. So I think that’s probably—no,
I don’t want that just to happen just yet.
I could always probably plant a tree where she can’t get to it but anyway it’s just some-
thing that we haven’t done. Plus we would also have to choose a time and a place that—
.. . the children weren’t around that I didn’t then have to go in and explain to them.They
know they’re IVF babies but I wouldn’t want to go any further with that . . . .
76 See David Ellison & Isabel Karpin,DeathWithout Life: Grievability and IVF, 110 SOUTH ATL. Q. 765 (2011).
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I can always basically look at that particular tree or plant and think, well, I’ve got that
memory of everything that I’ve gone through over the past 15 years basically, and that’s
the last memory I suppose. That’s the end of the line and this is where they are and I can
look at that and then think, well, that’s a living object. I know the plant could die or what-
ever but you know what I mean?
It’s just there as like a memory for me, probably more me. My husband, I don’t know
men sort of tend to think a bit—oh what’s the word—they’re just very cut and dried,
where I think women, especially going through process of IVF it’s all the what ifs and you
think a bit more about everything that you’re going through, you’re navigating through.
. . . It’s a clear tube with a yellow lid and it’s in the specimen bag tucked away behind
the butter . . . [because] it’s up high and the children can’t reach that far yet. I think Iwould
hate for them to one day open that butter or that area and go, ‘Mum,what’s this?’ So yeah,
I know I’mmaking light of it but I know I’ve probably got a limited time. I do need to find
that plant and I do need to sort that out because there will come—
So basically there’ll be a day when I think, right, I see a plant and I’ll think, well, that’s
the plant I want, and I’ll just do it, minus the dog and the kids.
There is a complex and intersectingwebof relationships atwork forPhoebe.Theem-
bryos are intimately connected to her, much more so than to her husband or existing
children from the same ‘batch’. Elsewhere, she says she is ‘probably a bit more emo-
tionally attached to them than the next woman’, having just relayed the ‘bit of a rough
trot’ she hadwith IVF including her near death experience from an earlier ectopic preg-
nancy. In this sense the tree she imagines is a record of her own arduous process and
she implicitly characterizes it as a memory of her, for her. But the ceremony is also for
the embryos as the end of a line, an end of her process, and an end of themselves. The
children and puppy are imagined as incursions on this private space, opening the butter
compartment, digging up the tree.
Thechoice of the fridge for storage, even in the express knowledge that thiswas unre-
lated to viability, uncomfortably and ambivalentlymirrors the cold storage of the clinic.
Phoebe chose not the freezer, but the butter compartment, in fact the warmest part of
the fridge, gesturing perhaps toward the warmth and containment of the bodily envi-
ronment that the embryos would not be returned to in order to offset the coldness of
mechanized storage? In all of these things appears the shadow of the other, none exists
in a separate or distinct state. Even the living tree which marks and transforms a death
of sorts (the end of the line) into a different kind of life is imagined to be vulnerable to
the too lively puppy, and immediately acknowledged as something that could itself die.
In re-reading Phoebe’s interview transcript, it is striking that she characterizes the
embryos as both there and not there in a process that is over but not yet complete:
I’m not silly, like I know this is the next step, we’ll get it done. I realise I’m going to be
sad with the next step, then that will be final. Even though I know it is now, that it’s all
done and dusted now sort of thing, and it’s now just the next step of having the symbol, I
suppose. I‘ve just got to then do that and then it will be—
The word ‘over’ remains unspoken, the sentence unfinished.
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Something useful to someone, that I would have felt really good about: Scarlet
Scarlet had a one- and a two-year-old child through IVF with two embryos left in stor-
age. Scarlet strongly wished to donate her embryos for the reproductive use of others
and, having been denied access to her clinic’s donation program because of a genetic
condition, she had then self-recruited recipients and begun a known-donation process
with a couple who were aware of and understood the condition. Scarlet described the
condition:
My family have a—not a disease, that’s the wrong word—an illness that’s passed from
mother to child and so all those embryos have this illness and both of my children do. It’s
a 100 per cent transmission to the child but then the child inherits it in varying disease.
So they can have like a five per cent disability, which you wouldn’t even notice right up to
100 per cent.
Scarlet volunteered that she had been taken aback when the clinic counselor pro-
posed that she and her partner should both let their own parents know about the dona-
tion:
By the time the child was say 18 or 20 there’s absolutely no guarantee our parents will
even be around, so I just didn’t think that that—I thought that was probably going a step
too far. It’s one thing to explain to our children that they may have siblings out there that
they’re biologically related to. I think it’s probably more thanmymum for instance could
cope with.
In imagining future kin, Scarlet saw the embryos as connected to her children, but
not to her parents, and she actively resisted the clinic’s emphasis on genetic link.
However, the clinic’s ethics committee refused to allow the donation to go ahead on
the basis that it would not be in the potential child’s best interests.77 Scarlet’s response
to this rejection reads back from the embryos as children-to-be, or rather as children-
who-will-never-be, to her own children’s disability, to her sense of herself as a mother
to those children and of herself as a person with a disability:
I find it a really difficult argument to accept, because I have produced two children from
exactly the same set of embryos and in essence they’re saying that that was not in the best
interests of my children. Now that’s quite a confronting statement because I think my
children are immensely loved and showered with everything they need and they’re well
built up, well cared for and it’s hard to say that it was not in their best interests to even
exist.
. . . I have the exact same disability as these embryos and I guess that’s also saying that
it would be in my best interests not to exist. A lot of people with disabilities and a lot
of parents of children with disabilities would find that an extremely confronting point of
view.
I’ve read things of parents with childrenwith serious disabilities like cystic fibrosis and
those kind of illnesses, where the child is wheelchair bound—I live a very normal life—
and those parents say theywould not bewithout those children.They love them somuch.
77 On the assessment of potential offspring interests in ART practice in Australia, see RachelThorpe et al., In the
Best Interests of the Child? Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Well-being of Offspring in Three
Australian States, 26 INT. J. L. POL’Y FAM. 259 (2012); de Lacey et al, Child Interests in Assisted Reproductive
Technology: How is the Welfare Principle Applied in Practice? 30 HUM. REPROD. 616 (2015).
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I guess a committee has decided I think in an extremely stretched sense of what is the best
interests of the child.
Physical selves and loved selves are merged as ‘well’ in Scarlet’s effort to articulate
best interests within a web of kin and social relations. At the end of the interview, Scar-
let said that she felt it was a terrible waste and unfair that the couple had been denied
the chance to receive her embryos, noting that the clinic had a two-year waiting list for
donation andwas currently closed to new recipients.78 She added that she too had been
denied the chance to do something she would have ‘felt really good about’.
Scarletwas very committed to the idea of her embryos as something ofworth: ‘There
was never any doubt in both mine and my husband’s mind that if they could be used
for something, they should be. It’s a really hard process to get to have embryos’. As a
result, she then tried to donate them for research into the specific genetic condition
she experienced, but was told that this ‘wasn’t worth it’ for two embryos, so she then
pursued donation to broader research.
Thepart ofme that kind of still makesme amother: Chloe
Chloe was the only interviewee in the study who had completed her treatment without
actually having a child or sustained a pregnancy. Because of her age and the fact that
she had experiencedmultiplemiscarriages, shewas not planning any further pregnancy
attempts. She had stopped treatment when she still had one embryo in storage and had
kept it for almost six years by the time of the interview. She said:
The only way I can articulate it is this is the only physical thing I have that’s the closest to
being a child. This is all I have left. . . it’s an embryo. It’s viable. . . this is for me personally
emotionally − it is a potential child that you and your husband have created. You have
nothing else left. This is it, the last hope. . . . I can’t get rid of it. Maybe I need to keep this
forever. I just can’t do it . . . .
That’s thedilemma thatwego throughconstantly. I keep looking at it, every sixmonths
it comes and I go I’ve got to do something, I’ve got to do something and I just stuff the
paperwork away in the desk and go, no, something inside me still feels okay that I’ve got
this living little thing there.That’s mine.
. . . [I]t’s the only living thing that I’ve created. Everyone else is − but it kind of still
makes me a mother.
AswithRose, implicit claims topersonhoodare specific and contingent: this embryo
is viable for me, potentially a child, a living thing that ismine.
78 Note that this ethical issue is distinct from selecting embryos in favor of disability, as these were the
only available embryos, and indeed had been utilized in her own treatment with no ethical objec-
tion. For discussion of the issue of use of affected embryos for reproductive donation, see Sheryl de
Lacey & Rob Norman, What Should We do with Donated Embryos that may be Genetically Affected? 19
HUM. REPROD. 1065 (2004). It is noteworthy that the 2015 draft NHMRC guidelines for the first
time state that donation of affected embryos should not be ‘arbitrarily prohibited’ but should instead
allow for a careful assessment of risks and impact with the recipient, including genetic counseling :
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Draft Ethical Guidelines on the Use of As-
sisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research; Public Consultation 2015, supra note 6, at
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‘Hope’ and potentiality are very particular and embodied in the IVF context, in
which women repeatedly, often over a number of years, have embryos transferred into
their bodies and then wait for a week to two weeks to see if they ‘take’ a process of not-
quite or temporary pregnancy. The relation of this embryo is to hope and to Chloe’s
deeply internal sense of herself as a mother, although in any real sense the hoped for
future is lost and she is a mother-never-to-be. In this sense, building on Karpin, Chloe
is a never-to-be-pregnant pregnant woman.
This quote from Chloe is the only interview quote that, when I have presented at
conferences, workshops, and professional fora, has always caused at least one person
listening to visibly cry. Inmy view, this reaction from listeners speaks to an ability of the
community, if properly informed, to have regard for women first and foremost in policy
and practice that has, to date, been dominated by regard for the disembodied embryo.
It is worth restating that Chloe’s wishes are not honored in law, and her embryo will
almost certainly have been compulsorily destroyed by the time of writing as a result of
the 10-year storage limit in her jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Many laws and ethical documents in Australia, as elsewhere, instruct us that disem-
bodied embryos created through IVF processes are not mere tissue; they are ‘widely
regarded’ as unique objects of serious moral consideration with a ‘special status’ that
commands ‘respect’.This paper has engaged in an historical analysis of Australian ethi-
cal governance to document how this characterization came to pass.These ethical and
policy documents characterize the embryo as an object of ideological compromise: not
mere cells and not life, but a poorly bounded and endlessly contested something-in-
between. I argue that the woman whose desire for a child or children created this em-
bryo, and who inhabits the body to whom it may one day be returned, is an omission
or at best an afterthought in such frameworks.
The paper engages with the narratives of women patients about their sense of con-
nectedness to their stored or discarded embryos, drawn from a larger study on decision
making concerning patient’s experience of decisionmaking about IVF embryos. I draw
on a selection of these narratives in some detail to illustrate their complex and con-
tingent experiences of regard, kinship and connection with their embryos and to ask
how we could reorient law and policy toward the concerns, needs, and desires of such
women. Decisions about storage and destruction are critical conflict points that have
triggered expressions of dismay by IVF participants when their feelings of connected-
ness with their embryos are disregarded.79 These are not the only areas in which ART
law and policy prioritize a universalized and disembodied respect for the embryo over
and above the feelings and wishes of those who created them, but they are the most
acute and, particularly in the case of destruction, the most painfully paradoxical.
Changing legal regulation and ethics governance to include the perspective of
women patients on their IVF embryos is a slow endeavor. It is notable that the 2015
draft the NHMRC guidelines, for the first time in their 30 year history, drop the re-
quirement of an embryo storage limit of 10 years. Yet they do so in away that continues
to sideline the woman undertaking treatment. First, the draft takes as a starting point
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the administrative priorities of the clinic in disposing of unclaimed embryos; and sec-
ond, it prioritizes the scientific expertise of the clinic in determining viability.Only then
does it go on to note that the duration of storage may also depend upon the ‘personal
preferences’ of the couple.80
Isabel Karpin has argued that in developing ideas of relational selfhood, we are not
obliged to treat woman and embryo as equal or to situate the embryo ‘as a rights bear-
ing entity that requires protection’. We are obliged to ‘respond to female agency and
embodiment formed through this complex (and sometimes uneasy) negotiation with
a matrix of relations and familial possibilities’81—and, I would add, with imagined fu-
ture possibilities and relations, including foreclosed and no longer possible futures,
losses, and potentialities hitherto unimagined. An ethical framework premised on re-
spect for the woman undertaking treatment must ask first what these relations mean to
thewomanand then seek to accommodate thismeaning. I suggest that an embedded in-
stitutional structure, such as that in place in Australia for the past 25 years through the
NHMRC, which legislatively mandates religious representation, and which does not
require the embodied perspective of a woman patient, will continue to center abstract
notions of regard for embryos at the expense of the needs of women who undertake
IVF treatment.
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81 Karpin, supra note 61, at 143.
 at U
niversity of T
echnology, Sydney on N
ovem
ber 23, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
